Against Permanent Power: Pakistan’s Critique of the G4 Model and the Pursuit of Equitable Security Council Reform

Overhauling the Security Council remains an imperative for member states, demanding sweeping reforms to cultivate a more equitable, effective, and credible framework for safeguarding global stability.

The disproportionate influence of the P5 renders broader global consensus practically irrelevant. Pakistan, as a steadfast member of the United for Consensus (UfC) group, resolutely opposes any elevation of permanent membership. We maintain that pivotal issues, particularly Security Council reform, must be addressed through consensus or the most expansive possible agreement. The notion of resorting to votes or fragmented reform processes is categorically unacceptable.

Pakistan unequivocally repudiates India’s G4 model, which further marginalizes the representation of smaller states. [1]This proposal aims to expand the Council’s membership from 15 to 25 or 26, adding six permanent and four or five non-permanent members. It further questions the fairness of electing permanent members, comparing it with dictatorial or monarchical systems rather than democratic principles. The proposed expansion would not increase regional representation or improve equity, noting that regions like Asia would have fewer opportunities for representation under the Group of Four’s model.[2] The inclusion of India as a permanent member could exacerbate dictatorial tendencies in the region, undermining democratic governance; therefore, there should be fair elections among states instead of establishing permanent memberships. The contributions of the Group of Four (G4) to international peace and security have been conspicuously deficient, particularly in addressing conflicts such as those in Ukraine and Gaza, where their interventions have been driven by parochial self-interest.[3]

These limitations highlight the urgent need for an inclusive reform model that takes into consideration the aspirations and interests of smaller nations and cross-regional alliances, such as the Small Island Developing States (SIDS), the Arab League, and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). In the event that India ascends to permanent membership of the UNSC, the geopolitical equilibrium, particularly vis-à-vis Pakistan, could be drastically recalibrated. India would likely wield its veto power to obstruct any resolutions favoring Pakistan, thereby enhancing its capacity to subject Pakistan to sustained international scrutiny, such as facilitating its prolonged placement on the FATF grey list. Furthermore, smaller states like Nepal may find themselves in a more vulnerable position when seeking resolutions to disputes, such as the Kalapani territorial issue, as India’s newfound status could amplify its leverage in bilateral negotiations and international forums.[4]

India’s influence as a permanent UNSC member could extend to coercing Pakistan into Conceding on strategic security matters, including demands for Pakistan’s disarmament or the relinquishment of its nuclear arsenal, alongside pressuring it to accede to international treaties like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Such a development would have Deep-seated ramifications for regional power dynamics, potentially destabilizing the already delicate balance of power in South Asia.[5]

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[1] Ungar, Maya. “Relevance and Reform: The United Nations Security Council of the Future.” Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations 30, no. 2 (2024): 304-312.

[2] Hosli, M.O. and Dörfler, T., 2020. The United Nations Security Council: History, Current Composition, and Reform Proposals (pp. 299-320). Springer International Publishing.

[3] Pinheiro, I.T., 2024. The Reform of the Security Council of the United Nations-The Maintenance of International Peace And Security Through Regional Representation. Leya.

[4] Wilson, Gary. “Enhancing diversity and representation within the United Nations Security Council: The dilemmas of reform.” International Politics 56 (2019): 495-513.

[5] Protocol, K., Governance, G., Trade, G., Insecurity, F., League, A. and League, M.A., United Nations Security Council.