Piercing Questions raised by AJ&K youth

 

 

1. The conflict is because raiders of NWFP, Wazir, Masood, and Memmend were sponsored by Pakistan, prompting Maharaja to seek help from India?
2. Why is the Pakistan Army consuming a significant budget ratio?

• Why did Pakistan focus more on Afghanistan than on Kashmir?

1. In all the trades, including CPEC and power projects, why don’t Kashmiris benefit while Pakistan takes all the advantages from Kashmir?
2. According to Article 35A, no officer above grade 17 shall be Pakistani nor can they buy land in Kashmir. Why are IGP, Chief Secretary, and Attorney General appointed from Pakistan?
3. Why are no Kashmiris appointed to higher posts in power projects?

• Why is there no base camp for the Army inside the city, but there are 17 in Kashmir?
• Are we truly independent, or are we not free socially, economically, and politically?

1. Why does Pakistan, as the legal party of the dispute, not withdraw its forces, as per UNSC resolutions?
2. Why are Mujahideen martyred more than Pakistani army soldiers, and why does the Pakistan army remain on the back foot?
3. What is our annual budget, and how much is Pakistan giving us?

• Is Pakistan benefiting from the taxes of the Kashmiri community?
• Given Jammu and Kashmir’s natural resources, geography, and culture, why do we need aid from Pakistan?
• Why does Pakistan administer Gilgit, which is also a disputed territory?

1. Is Pakistan benefiting from water resources in Kashmir?

• Why does Pakistan not withdraw its troops first according to UNSC resolutions regarding a plebiscite in Kashmir?
• Is the ISI controlling movements in Kashmir, and are they responsible for the situation?
• Should the ISI and its agents be exposed?
• Did the people of Kashmir betray the Shimla Agreement?

1. Whenever ceasefire line violations occur, why do Kashmiris always become victims?

• If Pakistan cannot afford to take Kashmir back, why does it sacrifice innocent Kashmiris?
• In a democratic country, why do police victimize parties like NSF if we seek freedom from Pakistan?
• Why is there no representation of any Kashmiri in the UN to solve the Kashmir dispute, which is primarily a matter for Kashmiris rather than for Pakistan or India?
  
• Why is there no representation of any Kashmiri in the U.N. to solve the Kashmir dispute as it’s the pure matter of Kashmir more than Pakistan and India?

P

ursuant to the stipulations established in Article 4 and Resolution 377 (V), colloquially designated as the “Uniting for Peace” resolution, the prerogative to pursue membership in the United Nations is circumscribed to entities recognized as sovereign states.[1][2] Applications for such membership must be duly submitted to the Secretary-General and undergo deliberation by the Security Council, which subsequently proffers recommendations to the General Assembly. The attainment of membership is contingent upon the acquisition of a two-thirds majority within the Assembly. Consequently, Pakistan is precluded from unilaterally advancing a Kashmiri representative to the United Nations in any capacity, whether as a member or observer. Representation at the UN is fundamentally anchored in recognized statehood, and Kashmir, lacking independent status, is categorized as a disputed territory in the ongoing conflict between India and Pakistan. Conversely, Pakistan has steadfastly championed the rights and perspectives of Kashmiris within international discourses, endeavouring to integrate Kashmiri representatives into dialogues and delegations concerning the complex Kashmir predicament. Noteworthy figures, including former Prime Minister Imran Khan and Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi, have strategically exploited the annual sessions of the UN General Assembly to illuminate egregious human rights violations in the region, while ardently advocating for the self-determination of the Kashmiri populace.[3] Moreover, Pakistan’s alliances with organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are Thoughtfully coordinated to showcase the systemic human rights abuses in Kashmir, thereby facilitating the acquisition of international support. Within the ambit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and during bilateral diplomatic overtures with leaders from nations such as Turkey, Malaysia, and China, Pakistani officials have consistently elevated the Kashmir issue, actively soliciting endorsement in multilateral forums. This diplomatic campaign has been further reinforced by official visits to various sovereign nations aimed at elucidating the paramount significance of Kashmir and procuring diplomatic backing. For instance, former Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar embarked on diplomatic missions to European states to galvanize support for Pakistan’s stance regarding the Kashmir question.

• Did the people of Kashmir betray in Shimla’s agreement?

In the wake of India’s revocation of the special status of Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJK), numerous voices in Pakistan have advocated for a unilateral abrogation of the 1972 Shimla Agreement. [4][5]However, the former government dismissed this idea as unworthy of serious consideration. Others contend that, given the agreement’s emphasis on peacefully resolving the Kashmir dispute, it should continue to be upheld. Regardless of India’s actions, the core issue of Kashmir persists, and many believe that India will ultimately have to confront it, thus maintaining the relevance of the Shimla Agreement.[6]

The current framework regarding the Kashmir issue is far from optimistic. For the past fifty years, India has often leveraged the Shimla Agreement as a means to stall significant discussions on Kashmir. The situation took a sharp turn on August 5, 2019, effectively rendering the agreement obsolete.

When Pakistan raises the Kashmir issue on international platforms, India responds vehemently, claiming that Pakistan is violating the Shimla Agreement. To address this, it’s vital to revisit the agreement’s fundamental points.

Key Articles of the Shimla Agreement:[7]

1. Article 1 (1): Relations between the two countries must align with UN principles.
2. Article 1 (2): Both nations are committed to resolving disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations.

• Article 4 (2): The Line of Control, established after the 1971 ceasefire, must be respected without any unilateral alterations.

Pakistan has consistently upheld its obligations under this agreement.

First, India’s claim that Pakistan cannot bring up the Kashmir issue internationally is misleading. While Pakistan has agreed to resolve the matter bilaterally, this does not restrict it from engaging with the international community regarding developments in IIOJK.

Second, India violated the Shimla Agreement in 1984 when it seized the Siachen Glacier, escalating tensions that later contributed to the Kargil conflict in 1999. A peaceful resolution to the Siachen dispute might have prevented future confrontations.[8][9]

Third, India breached the agreement by revoking the special status of IIOJK and bifurcating it into two Union Territories. There are also legitimate concerns about demographic changes in the region that threaten the local Muslim majority. In light of these violations, the Shimla Agreement seems to have lost its significance. India has effectively reversed progress to a state that predates 1971.[10] It is imperative for Pakistan to rethink its strategy on Kashmir. The past fifty years have illustrated that the Shimla Agreement has become a barrier to peace. I believe that resolving the Kashmir dispute may necessitate sustained third-party mediation. With India’s growing economic strength, its position on Kashmir is becoming increasingly rigid. Pakistan needs to take decisive action to encourage India toward resolution. The time for ineffective diplomacy on this matter has passed.

Proposed Actions for Pakistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir:

1. Appoint a Special Envoy for Jammu and Kashmir to devise a strategy aimed at applying pressure on India.
2. Amend Article 2 of Azad Jammu and Kashmir’s interim constitution to extend its authority to encompass IIOJK.

• Appoint a ‘Plebiscite Advisor’ as detailed in Article 11 of the interim constitution, similar to the measures taken in 1990.

By implementing these actions, Pakistan can significantly bolster the Kashmir cause. Both Pakistan and the Kashmiri people need to actively engage with this pressing issue. To attract international support for our position on Kashmir, we must first take proactive steps ourselves. Despite the challenges we face, there remains a path to advocate for meaningful negotiations with India. As a Swedish proverb reminds us, “Those who wish to sing will always find a song.”

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

3)  Is Pakistan taking benefit of water from Kashmir?

To understand the water dynamics between India and Pakistan, it’s essential to scrutinize how Pakistan utilizes water from the Kashmir region.

The Indus River begins in Tibet and flows southward for approximately 3,200 kilometers through Pakistan before emptying into the Arabian Sea. The river basin is divided as follows: around 60% is in Pakistan, about 20% in India, roughly 5% in Afghanistan, and approximately 15% in Tibet. To facilitate irrigation and hydroelectric power generation, India and Pakistan have built several dams along the river.

The Indus River is nourished by five prominent tributaries, with the Jhelum, the largest, springing forth from the mountainous regions of Kashmir. The Chenab winds through Jammu before entering Indian Punjab, while the other tributaries Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas either originate in or flow through Himachal Pradesh on their journey toward Punjab, India. Should the Line of Control (LoC) be recognized as an international border, India would assume the role of the upper riparian, with Pakistan as the lower riparian throughout the entire Indus system.

This river has imperative significance for both nations, but its impact is especially felt in Pakistan, where over 92% of the land is classified as arid or semi-arid. In India, the Indus is indispensable for the water-scarce regions of Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan, which are vital to agricultural production. Given that a substantial portion of Pakistan’s workforce is engaged in agriculture, and considering Punjab’s status as a leading wheat producer in India, the Indus River stands as a lifeline, underpinning the economic vitality of both countries.

Political history of water

The partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 presented considerable challenges for Sir Cyril Radcliffe regarding the Indus River system, essential for both nations.[11] This division complicated water management, especially in Punjab, where a sophisticated irrigation network established during British rule was in place. Initially, an agreement allowed existing water-sharing practices to persist until March 31, 1948.[12] However, on April 1, 1948, Indian Punjab severed water supplies to Pakistan. As the conflict over Kashmir intensified, it became intertwined with water disputes, prompting India to raise the issue at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in January 1948. A ceasefire was declared on April 21, 1948, yet the underlying tensions persisted. Later that year, Eugene Black, the president of the World Bank, offered to mediate the water-sharing conflict. While India was initially reluctant to accept external mediation, both nations ultimately consented to his proposal. The early discussions in 1948 addressed the Kashmir issue and water disputes as separate matters.[13][14] In the nascent years of sovereignty, vulnerabilities became evident, especially for Pakistan, as India’s capacity to halt canal supplies during pivotal planting seasons illuminated its reliance on water sources under Indian control. A British general remarked in 1948 that the emphasis was on Pakistan’s “water insecurity,” given its rivers’ dependence on Indian tributaries. Scholars posited that resolving disputes

 

over water could mitigate the frictions surrounding Kashmir. Yet, during this period, military and political confrontations were more influenced by ideological and sovereign matters than by the specifics of water allocation. A 1951 missive from the British High Commission suggested that Pakistan.

 

 

 

 

would likely dismiss any settlement permitting Indian dominion over Kashmir, fearing repercussions for its water resources.[15]

While Indian officials maintained that complete control over the Indus flow was impractical, it became evident that dialogues concerning water could have profound implications for the Kashmir dilemma. Despite ongoing negotiations about water, Pakistan held that resolving canal issues could facilitate progress on the Kashmir question, a stance firmly opposed by India.

In September 1960, the Indus Water Treaty was established, allocating exclusive rights to Pakistan for the three western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab) and to India for the three eastern rivers (Sutlej, Ravi, and Beas). This accord alleviated tensions for several decades, overshadowing the hydrological ramifications tied to Kashmir.

Nevertheless, with the burgeoning populations in both nations, water resources became increasingly strained. By the 1990s, the hydrological relevance of Kashmir resurfaced as a pressing issue, especially as India pursued ambitious irrigation initiatives.

 

 

 

 

 

• Pakistan is taking benefits from the taxes of the Kashmiri community.

Facet	Jammu & Kashmir	Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK)
Tax Authority	Government of Jammu & Kashmir	Government of AJK
Main Taxes Collected	Income Tax, Sales Tax, Property Tax	Income Tax, Sales Tax, Excise Duty[16]
Tax Rates	Generally higher, which can support larger projects	Lower rates encourage economic activity and growth[17][18]
Revenue Utilization	Funds major infrastructure and development projects	on immediate relief and welfare, enhancing quality of life
Recent Changes	Increasing taxes to meet fiscal challenges	Introduction of subsidy packages shows responsiveness to public needs
Taxpayer Sentiment	Concerns about high rates, but investments in public goods	Improved sentiment following subsidy announcements and relief measures[19]

Pakistani government is striving to balance taxation with public welfare, in Azad Kashmir

• Jammu and Kashmir have a lot of natural resources, geography, and culture, so why do we need the aid of Pakistan?

Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) confronts a constellation of formidable challenges that complicate its endeavour to cultivate adequate revenue for persistent economic growth. Even with a plethora of resources, the region’s capacity to diversify its income sources beyond established sectors like agriculture and tourism has been constrained, resulting in a narrow tax base and a deficient tax-to-GDP ratio. Moreover, although AJK’s hydropower and tourism sectors exhibit substantial promise, their advancement is fettered by infrastructural deficiencies, promotional shortcomings, and persistent security challenges. Biggest problem is narrow taxation in AJK primarily relies on agriculture and tourism for revenue, which limits its tax base. The region’s ability to expand into other sectors is hindered, resulting in a low tax-to-GDP ratio compared to international standards. Also, infrastructural limitations that impact economic activity. Poor transportation and utility infrastructure prevent effective revenue generation, especially in sectors like tourism and energy. AJK has considerable hydropower potential, but infrastructural deficits hinder its ability to harness this resource effectively. The region is unable to fully capitalize on its capacity for electricity generation, affecting overall economic productivity. Despite having beautiful landscapes, historical sites, and a rich cultural heritage, AJK struggles to promote tourism effectively. The lack of investment in marketing, inadequate infrastructure, and security concerns diminish the region’s attractiveness to tourists. [20][21]

Remittances constitute a pivotal element in the economic structure of Azad Kashmir (AJK), predominantly influenced by the dynamics of international migratory patterns. The World Bank’s estimates suggest that remittance inflows to developing territories escalated to an astounding $540 billion in 2020, accentuating their indispensable significance. Research conducted in the Bhimber district elucidate that migration has engendered enhancements in living standards, augmented employment stability, and escalated household revenues. Moreover, agriculture is fundamental to AJK’s economic architecture, contributing approximately 30-40% of fiscal inputs from agrarian pursuits, while ancillary non-farm activities generate an estimated 60-70% of total income streams.[22]

The sector employs about 38.5% of the workforce and contributes 19.2% to the GDP. Despite initiatives to support farmers, challenges such as climate change, water scarcity, and rural-urban migration hinder agricultural development. Innovative strategies are necessary to boost productivity. Forestry resources cover 15% of AJK’s land area and are critical for the local economy. The wood industry, including sawmills and furniture manufacturing, provides jobs for around 16,000 people. [23]However, the region has faced deforestation, impacting both the environment and economic potential.

Tourism significantly contributes to AJK’s economy and employment. Research shows that tourism improves residents’ quality of life by providing jobs in hotels, transport, and local businesses. The construction sector also benefits from tourism growth. Efforts to promote tourism can further enhance income and living standards, including opportunities for women in the workforce.

Hydropower is another key sector, with AJK having the potential to meet over 90% of Pakistan’s energy demands. Major projects, like the Neelum Jhelum Hydropower Project and Mangla Dam, are crucial for economic growth. Harnessing AJK’s hydropower potential can positively influence various economic and social indicators. The recent upheaving protest in azad Kashmir culminated with $82 million worth of subsidies to provide immediate economic relief.[24][25] The decision to grant subsidies to Pakistan-administered Kashmir coincides with a visit from an International Monetary Fund (IMF) team to Pakistan, where they are discussing a long-term loan program. Historically, the IMF has urged Pakistan to reduce subsidies and raise energy prices.

 

 

• As Gilgit is also a disputed territory, why does Pakistan administrate it?

Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) merits recognition should be full-fledged province under Pakistan’s Constitution, distinctly apart from the Kashmir dilemma. Historical narratives indicate that the Dogra rulers of Kashmir imposed their control over Baltistan through military force, lacking any legitimate legal or constitutional foundation. The local populace never acquiesced to this authority, suggesting that such military incursions do not justify a connection between GB and Kashmir. Prior to and during the Dogra era, the region was characterized by numerous small kingdoms, each governed by local leaders known as rajas and mirs. Although the British and Dogra dynasty exercised joint control over the Gilgit Agency, these local sovereigns retained considerable autonomy. The ruling elites were bestowed with officer positions in the Gilgit Scouts, thus allowing them a significant role in influencing the region’s trajectory.[26][27]

As British rule approached its conclusion and Pakistan and India gained independence, the Gilgit Scouts rejected the new Dogra leadership amid uncertainty about their status. Tensions escalated, leading to uprisings throughout Kashmir. In response to fears of Muslim revolts, the Maharaja of Kashmir announced the region’s accession to India on October 27, 1947, leaving Gilgit in a precarious situation regarding its future. On October 31, 1947, the Gilgit Scouts, organized into a Revolutionary Council, initiated a revolt against Dogra rule. Muslim soldiers under Mirza Hasan Khan launched an attack on the Maharaja’s Kashmiri troops stationed in Bunji near Gilgit, compelling the Sikh companies to retreat toward Rondu in Baltistan.[28]

Following resistance, Governor Ghansara Singh capitulated to Sub Maj Babar, facilitating the liberation of Gilgit from Dogra domination and the subsequent proclamation of the “Islamic Republic of Gilgit” on November 1, 1947. A provisional administration was formed, with Raja Shah Raees Khan presiding and Col Mirza Hasan Khan leading the military. Merely 15 days later, Gilgit acceded to Pakistan[29].

In its formative years, Pakistan grappled with the complexities of governing Gilgit-Baltistan (GB). The region was stripped of its administrative autonomy, subjected to oversight by federal bureaucrats. Pakistan sought to tether GB to Kashmir, anticipating increased support in a prospective United Nations plebiscite designed to resolve the Kashmir dispute. This association rendered GB a disputed territory, devoid of representation in Pakistan’s national legislature and existing in a state of constitutional ambiguity.

Numerous administrations have sought to rectify these challenges, yet the situation remains intractable. The integration of GB into Pakistan is intricately complicated, as both India and Pakistan lay claim to it as part of Kashmir. When India put forth its arguments at the UN, those claims were dismissed, further entrenching the region’s status as disputed, including GB, with a plebiscite anticipated to adjudicate the issue under specific stipulations. Historical records reveal that the Dogra rulers executed a forcible annexation of Baltistan without any legal or constitutional basis, and the local populace consistently resisted their authority. This indicates that military incursion cannot justify the linkage between GB and Kashmir.

Qasim Naseem, a senior journalist from GB,[30] argues that if we accept the reasoning for classifying GB as part of Kashmir, we could similarly claim that both Pakistan and India are part of Britain. He highlights that Kashmir was once ruled by Sultan Saeed Khan Kashgiri and was significantly controlled by the Afghans, but that does not make Kashmir a part of Kashgar or Afghanistan. Similarly, we do not recognize Indian-administered Kashmir as part of India, even though it has been under Indian control since 1948.

 

 

 

[1] Kelsen, Hans. “Membership in the United Nations.” Colum. L. Rev. 46 (1946): 391.

[2] Hossain, Kamrul. “The Concept of Jus Cogens and the Obligation Under the UN Charter.” Santa Clara J. Int’l L. 3 (2005): 72.

[3] Kuszewska, Agnieszka. “The India-Pakistan conflict in Kashmir and human rights in the context of post-2019 political dynamics.” Asian Affairs 53, no. 1 (2022): 198-217.

[4] Mustafa, Zubeida. “The Kashmir dispute and the Simla agreement.” Pakistan Horizon 25, no. 3 (1972): 38-52.

[5] Rahman, A., Muneer, S., & Khan, M. M. A. (2021). Impact of Shimla Agreement on the Application of UN Resolutions on Jammu and Kashmir: A Critical Analysis under International Law. Perennial Journal of History, 2(2), 285-302.

[6] Arif, Mohammad. “The Kashmir Dispute and Pakistan-India Relations: 1972-1992.” Pakistan Horizon 47, no. 1 (1994): 35-45.

[7] Bakshi, K. N., and Indian Foreign Affairs Journal. “Simla Agreement (1972): From Military Victory to A Diplomatic Defeat?.” Indian Foreign Affairs Journal (2007): 105-119.

[8] Indurthy, Rathnam. “HUMAN RIGHTS IN US POLICY TOWARDS INDIA AND ISRAEL.” The Indian Journal of Political Science 57, no. 1/4 (1996): 29-59.

[9] Shakoor, Farzana. “Pakistan India Relations after the End of the Cold War.” Pakistan Horizon 45, no. 4 (1992): 47-59.

[10] Firdous, Kiran. “India-Pakistan peace process 1999-2005.” PhD diss., Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, 2006.

[11] Sridhar, Seema. “Kashmir and water: conflict and cooperation.” Swords and Ploughshares, winter 2007-8 (2008).

[12] Hussain, Sajjad, and Muhammad Ahsan Ghazali. “Geological, Historical, Political, Socio-Economic and Legal Context of Hydro-Politics in South Asia–Kashmir Discord.” SADIQ Journal of Pakistan Studies 1, no. 2 (2021).

[13] Hussain, Sajjad, Farrukh Faheem, and Saif Ul Islam. “Impact of Hydro-Politics and Kashmir issue on bilateral relations of India and Pakistan.” Journal of Humanities, Social and Management Sciences (JHSMS) 2, no. 1 (2021): 200-213.

[14] Gumas, Evan D. “The Use of Water as a Weapon Against Public Health in Palestine and Kashmir.” (2021).

[15] Dhar, P. N. “The Kashmir problem: Political and economic background.” India Quarterly 7, no. 2 (1951): 142-162.

[16] World Bank. (n.d.). Pakistan overview: Economic indicators and trends. Retrieved September 23, 2024, from https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/pakistan/overview

[17] Government of Jammu & Kashmir. (n.d.). Taxation policies and revenue utilization. Retrieved September 23, 2024, from https://jkgad.nic.in

[18] Government of Azad Jammu & Kashmir. (n.d.). Fiscal policies and tax revenue. Retrieved September 23, 2024, from http://www.ajk.gov.pk

[19] akistan Institute of Development Economics. (n.d.). Economic analysis of taxation in Pakistan. Retrieved September 23, 2024, from https://www.pide.org.pk/publications/

[20] MAHMOOD, K.D., 1983. THE GEOGRAPHICAL ELEMENT OF PAKISTAN’S NATIONAL POWER (Doctoral dissertation, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad).

[21] Burki, Shahid Javed. Kashmir: A problem in search of a solution. United States Institute of Peace, 2007.

[22] Sheikh, Bilal Ahmad, and A. S. Bhat. “Structural Changes in Jammu and Kashmir Economy.” PhD diss., Thesis, 2010.

[23] Khursheed, Anum, Malik Muhammad Shafi, and Haidar Ali. “Effect of Azad Jammu and Kashmir rural support program in natural resource management with special reference to livestock.” (2019): 513-522.

[24] Dar, M. E. U. I., Roland Cochard, R. P. Shreshta, and Sajjad Ahmad. “Plant resource utilization by local inhabitants around Machiara National Park, Azad Kashmir, Pakistan.” Journal of Food, Agriculture and Environment 10, no. 3-4 (2012): 1139-1148.

[25] Rose, Leo E. “The Politics of Azad Kashmir.” In Perspectives on Kashmir, pp. 235-253. Routledge, 2019.

[26] Sökefeld, Martin. “Not part of Kashmir, but of the Kashmir Dispute.” Kashmir: History, politics, representation (2017): 132.

[27] Ullah, Azmat, Mian Muhammad Azhar, and Muhammad Raza. “History Of Reforms In Gilgit-Baltistan And Struggle Of Its People For A Non-Kashmiri Separate Identity.” Webology (ISSN: 1735-188X) 18, no. 4 (2021).

[28] Hussain, Shafqat. “The History of Gilgit-Baltistan.” In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Asian History. 2021.

[29] Kuszewska, Agnieszka. “Nation building and Kashmir.” In Kashmir in India and Pakistan Policies. Taylor & Francis, 2022.

[30] Qasim, M., Hussain, S., & Ali, K. (2024). Political Evolution in Gilgit Baltistan: A Historical Analysis of Governance Structures and Regional Dynamics: Administration. Journal of Asian Development Studies, 13(1), 341-349.